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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Gabriel Wilner, in whose honored memory this article is written, asked 
me many years ago to contribute to the Brussels Seminar.  The subject was 
Community Social Law, including free movement of workers.  Gabriel 
would occasionally sit in on my lectures.  Sometimes he would comment, 
sometimes he was content to listen, with that familiar look of intent 
benevolence which others will also remember with affection, and is captured 
in certain photographs which happily bring him back, for a moment.   
One of the cases I referred to in my lectures was Public Prosecutor v. 
Mutsch (Mutsch),1 which illustrates how far the principle of non-
discrimination can—or can’t—take you.  Mutsch was about a Belgian 
procedural rule whose origins go back to the 1930s, a time when Belgium 
was trying to consolidate its links with its then newly-acquired German-
speaking region, which was transferred from Germany following a plebiscite 
after the First World War.2  Stated briefly, the rule was that German-
speaking inhabitants of this area could use German in certain local criminal 
courts, even if that court’s usual language was French.3  The rule could only 
be invoked by Belgians; at that time, the Belgians understandably had no 
intention of allowing it to be used by anyone else.  Many years later, with the 
European Community in place, including its rules about migrant workers, a 
Luxembourg resident in this Belgian region was charged with a minor 
offense in one of these courts.4  He invoked the rule, but its application was 
stayed by the Cour d’Appel, Liège (Court of Appeals, Liège), since, even 
though he met the residence condition, he was not Belgian.5  A preliminary 
question was referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ or the Court), 
which ruled that this restriction on migrant workers was not permissible 
under Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, which provides that all 
Community workers are to enjoy the same “social advantages” in the host 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Case 137/84, Ministère Pub. v. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681. 
 2 See Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, The “Requirement” of Plebiscite in Territorial 
Rapprochement, 12 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 23, 28–29 (1989) (“[N]eutral and Prussian Moresnet, 
which had a predominantly German population, was ceded to Belgium . . . .”). 
 3 Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681, para. 3.  For the modern application of the Law of 15 June 
1935 on the use of languages in the courts, see Jean Laenens & George Van Mellaert, The 
Judicial System and Procedure 93–94, in INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW (Hubert Bocken & 
Walter de Bondt eds., 2001). 
 4 Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681, para. 2. 
 5 Id. paras. 4–5. 
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state as national workers.6  While the expression “social advantages” was 
clearly intended to refer primarily to social security benefits, the Court 
interpreted it broadly, as referring to measures which could facilitate the 
exercise of the right of free movement, thus including procedural rules in 
criminal courts which were available to national workers.7  Therefore, even 
though there was no Community “competence” (i.e., no power to regulate) in 
respect of national criminal procedure, the Community rule forbidding 
discrimination against migrant workers applied. 
On the other hand, Mutsch does not mean that any migrant worker can 
use his own language in the host state’s courts, whatever that language may 
be.  An Italian migrant worker in Belgium cannot use Italian in a Belgian 
court, since a Belgian cannot use Italian in that court either.  The Mutsch 
judgment only means that if a national worker living in a state (or 
jurisdiction) can use a particular language in its courts (or some of them), the 
migrant worker living in that state (or jurisdiction) can also use that 
particular language in its courts (or those particular courts).  
This case intrigued Gabriel—an excellent linguist himself—and it is in 
memory of the interest he showed in it, and of the kindness he did me in 
asking me to contribute to his Brussels project, that I have chosen the subject 
of official languages for this Article.  It is a matter of some contemporary 
interest: on the one hand, the number of official languages has more than 
doubled (from 11 to 23) since 2004, with the recent enlargements of the 
Community.  On the other hand, the issue of official languages, and when the 
institutions can or must use particular languages, has been the subject of a 
large and increasing number of judgments in the last few years.  
II.  TREATY PROVISIONS ON LANGUAGES 
Languages are an inescapable part of European Union affairs.  While the 
European Coal & Steel Community Treaty of 1951 was only authentic in 
French,8 the Official Journal of the European Coal and Steel Community was 
                                                                                                                   
 6 Id. paras. 15–18. 
 7 Id.; see also Annette Schrauwen, Essay, Sink or Swim Together?  Developments in 
European Citizenship, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 778, 791 (2000) (“An argument against free 
movement without financial guarantees was the lack of harmonization of social security 
systems and the wish to avoid ‘benefits tourism.’ ”). 
 8 Compare Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community art. 100, Apr. 18, 
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (stating that it was “drawn up in a single original,” and make no 
reference to which language was authentic), with Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union art. 53, Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]; TEU art. 55 
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also published in German, Italian, and Dutch.  ECJ cases could be heard in 
any of the four languages, but of course these cases only concerned a few 
large coal and steel producers.9  However, things changed by 1957, when the 
European Economic Community and Euratom Treaties were signed—the 
former of which potentially applied to all economic operators, workers as 
much as employers.10  These 1957 Treaties and their successors are all 
authentic in all the official Union languages declared as such by the Member 
States.  The matter is still governed by Regulation 1 of 1958 (Regulation 
1/58), as amended.11  It is important to emphasize the word official, which is 
used in Regulation 1/58.  It is for each Member State to determine what 
language or languages are official in its territory or part of its territory.12  
Likewise, it is for each Member State to declare to the Union which language 
or languages are to be regarded as official for Union purposes, in dealings 
with that State and its residents.  A language may be official throughout the 
territory of a Member State but not be an official Union language, because 
that Member State has not declared it official for this purpose.13  The same 
goes for regional languages in a Member State: even if they enjoy official 
recognition in a given region, these regional languages are not Union 
languages, even for the areas which the language in question is internally 
                                                                                                                   
(“This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, 
Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages, 
the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic.”), and Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 358, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 
83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] (applying art. 55 of the TEU).  
 9 D.G. VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 
147, 181–92 (1955). 
 10 EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 509 (Damien Chalmers et al. eds., 2008). 
 11 Council Regulation 1/58, Languages to be Used by the European Economic Community, 
Oct. 6, 1958, 1958 O.J. (17) 385 [hereinafter Regulation 1/58]. 
 12 See id. art. 8 (“If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be 
used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law.”). 
 13 For example, Turkish is not presently a Union language (see Official EU Languages, 
EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/languages-of-europe/doc135en.htm (last  
updated Aug. 8, 2011)), even though it is an official language in Cyprus (see Languages 
Across Europe: Cyprus, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/languages/European_languages/country 
es/Cyprus.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011)).  Cyprus did not, however, declare Turkish an 
official Union language in respect of Cyprus when it acceded in 2004.  This conflict is the 
background to Case T-455/04, Beyatli v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-0000, aff’d, Case C-238/07 
P, Beyatli v. Comm’n 2007 E.C.R. I-140, which concerned Turkish Cypriots who challenged 
the fact that they could not choose Turkish as their primary language in a recruitment 
competition.  However, the substantive issue was not decided, as the case was held 
inadmissible. 
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official, if they have not been so declared to the Union by that Member 
State.14  This rule is true even if the language concerned is an official Union 
language in another Member State.15  
Paragraph (1) of Article 55 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as 
amended, lists the languages in which the TEU is authentic: 
This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian, 
Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, 
German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, 
Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these 
languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the 
archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which will 
transmit a certified copy to each of the governments of the 
other signatory States.16  
Paragraph (2) of Article 55 concerns what are sometimes called the 
“additional” languages which, as we shall see, are not declared official Union 
languages under Regulation 1/58.17 
This Treaty may also be translated into any other languages as 
determined by Member States among those which, in 
accordance with their constitutional order, enjoy official status 
in all or part of their territory.  A certified copy of such 
                                                                                                                   
 14 NIAMH NIC SHUIBHNE, EC LAW AND MINORITY LANGUAGE POLICY 6 (2007).  Article 2 of 
Regulation 1/58, refers only to the right of a correspondent to address the institutions in any of 
the official languages, which are those listed in Article 1 of Regulation 1/58, not to “working” 
or “additional” languages.  Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, arts. 1–2. 
 15 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 3.  Thus, Member State A may internally recognize 
not only its national language X, but also language Y, in respect of region Z which forms part 
of A’s territory.  However, if state A has only declared language X to be an official Union 
language in respect of itself, the consequence is that an institution may not address an official 
act to state A in any language other than X.  Nor may the institution use language Y even to 
address such an act to a citizen of A, who lives in region Z and uses language Y.  That is so 
even if language Y happens to be an official Union language (for example, because it has been 
so declared by Member State B).  The contrary would apply only if state A has declared 
language Y to be an official Union language in respect of itself, or the relevant part of its 
territory. 
 16 TEU art. 55. 
 17 See Council Conclusion, Official Use of Additional Languages, 2005 O.J. (C 148) 1 
(referring to the languages not mentioned as “official languages” in Regulation 1/58 as 
“additional languages”). 
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translations shall be provided by the Member States concerned 
to be deposited in the archives of the Council.18 
Article 20 paragraph (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) provides: 
Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to 
the duties provided for in [the TEU and the TFEU].  They shall 
have, inter alia: . . . (d) the right to petition the European 
Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to 
address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any 
of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same 
language.19 
Further, per Article 24 of the TFEU, “[e]very citizen of the Union may write 
to any of the institutions or bodies referred to in this Article or in Article 13 
of the [TEU] in one of the languages mentioned in Article 55(1) of the 
[TEU] and have an answer in the same language.”20 
Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFR) provides: “[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or 
belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”21 
Article 41(4) of the CFR, on a citizen’s right to good administration, is 
similar to the TFEU’s Article 24: “Every person may write to the institutions 
of the Union in one of the languages of the [TEU and the TFEU] and must 
have an answer in the same language.”22 
The European Union recently adopted a general principle of protecting 
linguistic diversity in Article 22 of the CFR which states that “[t]he Union 
shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”23  The last paragraph 
of Article 3(3) of the TEU provides the same effect: “[The European Union] 
shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that 
                                                                                                                   
 18 TEU art. 55. 
 19 TFEU art. 20. 
 20 Id. art. 24 (emphasis added). 
 21 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. 
(C 83) 389 [hereinafter CFR] (emphasis added).  
 22 Id. art. 41(4) (emphasis added). 
 23 Id. art. 22 (emphasis added). 
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Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”24  Linguistic 
diversity is also referred to in Articles 165 and 207 of the TFEU, concerning 
the European Union’s contribution to education policy and international 
agreements on trade in cultural goods, respectively.25  Article 4(2) of the 
TEU, which could be taken as a reference to linguistic equality, provides that 
“[t]he [European] Union shall respect the equality of Member States before 
the [TEU and the TFEU] as well as their national identities.”26  
However, neither Article 3(3) nor Article 4(2) of the TEU is relevant to 
the question of what languages are official.  Indeed, nothing in the TEU and 
the TFEU themselves determines that matter.  While they contain provisions 
stating in which languages they are authentic, that is not the same thing as 
stating what languages are official for purposes of secondary legislation.27  In 
fact, these two treaties leave it to the Council to decide, without imposing 
any limitations on its choices.28  
The role of the Council in relation to official languages reveals how the 
sensitivity of the official language issue can affect many matters, even an 
essential economic issue such as the creation of Union intellectual property 
rights:  
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market, the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
shall establish measures for the creation of European 
intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the 
setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, 
coordination and supervision arrangements. 
 The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, shall by means of regulations establish language 
arrangements for the European intellectual property rights.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 24 TEU art. 3(3). 
 25 TFEU arts. 165, 207. 
 26 TEU art. 4(2). 
 27 Irish was not declared an official language by Ireland in 1973 for the purposes of 
Regulation 1/58, but the Treaties have always been authentic in Irish.  
 28 TFEU art. 342 (“The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Union shall, 
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously by means of regulations.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European 
Parliament.29 
Thus a distinction is made between creating the substantive intellectual 
property regime itself (which only requires the ordinary legislative 
procedure—Parliament plus Council, the latter normally acting by qualified 
majority) and creating the linguistic rules of the regime (which requires 
unanimity, and the Parliament is merely consulted).30  The existence of this 
separate legal basis for a language regime in a specialized context implies that 
the Council can adopt a regime for this purpose which differs from the general 
regime under Article 342, for example by adopting a regime using only some 
of the languages recognized as official under Regulation 1/58.31  Indeed, this 
has already been done for Union trademarks, where a regime of only five 
official languages (English, French, German, Italian and Spanish) has been 
created; this is the background to the Kik32 case discussed in Part IV. 
The Commission made a proposal in 2000 for a Community patent.33  
Given that there already exists an autonomous (non-Community) European 
patent system run by the European Patent Office in Munich, which operates 
in three languages only (English, French and German),34 the Commission 
likewise proposed a three-language system for the Community patent.35  This 
proposal encountered the implacable opposition of some Member States 
(principally Italy and Spain).36  It is mainly for this reason that the proposal 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Id. art. 118 (emphasis added). 
 30 Compare id. art. 294, with id. art. 188. 
 31 See id. art. 342 (providing that the Council determines the rules governing languages). 
 32 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-361/01 P, Kik v. Office for Harmonisation 
in the Internal Market (OHIM), 2003 E.C.R. I-08283. 
 33 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, COM (2000) 
412 final (July 5, 2000) [hereinafter Community Patent Proposal]. 
 34 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 14(1), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 
[hereinafter European Patent Convention]. 
 35 See Community Patent Proposal, supra note 33, at sec. 2.4.3.1 (referencing the “office’s 
three working languages”).  See also Seth Cannon, Note, Achieving the Benefits of a 
Centralized Community Patent System at Minimal Cost, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 415, 425 
(2003) (“Under this proposal, the inventor must translate the entire patent into one of the 
[European Patent Office] languages (i.e., English, French, and German) . . . .”). 
 36 See, e.g., Xavier Buffet-Delmas & Laura Morelli, Modifications to the European Patent 
System, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 18, 22 (2008) (indicating the disagreement among 
Member States and the lack of a Community Patent System to date); Judit Zegnal, Talks 
Continue over EU-wide Patenting, NEW WORLD PUB., Aug. 22, 2005, NEW WORLD PUBL’G 
(citing the “lack of agreement [on Community patent proposal issues] such as how to treat 
patent infringements which might arise as a result of mistranslations”). 
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has still not been adopted, more than ten years later.37  The patent system 
may now become one of the first examples of “enhanced cooperation,” a new 
procedure under Article 20(2) of the TEU and Article 329 of the TFEU 
which allow those Member States that support a proposed measure to adopt 
it amongst themselves (if there are at least nine states) when the required 
majority cannot be found for a normal legislative act.38  
III.  REGULATION 1/58 AND LANGUAGE PRACTICES IN THE INSTITUTIONS 
Turning to the content of Regulation 1/58, it can be summarized by 
saying that it provides for two language regimes—one external and one 
internal.  The external regime reflects the treaty provisions quoted above and 
is set out in Articles 1 through 5.  Regulation 1/58 originally provided for 
four official languages (Dutch, French, German, and Italian).  As amended 
following successive enlargements, Articles 1 through 5 now read: 
 
Article 1 
 The official languages and the working languages of the 
institutions of the Community shall be Bulgarian, Czech, 
Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, 
Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, 
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and 
Swedish.39 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
 37 See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 35, at 415 (“After more than 25 years of discussion, the 
European Community [ ] has not reached complete agreement on a proposed Community 
patent system which would create a ‘unified’ patent effective throughout the European 
Union[ ].”); Timo Minssen, Meanwhile on the Other Side of the Pond: Why 
Biopharmaceutical Inventions That Were “Obvious to Try” Still Might Be Non-Obvious—
Part I, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 60, 69 n.30 (2010) (“Although a Community patent 
system has been debated for many years, there is still no [Community] patent available.”). 
 38 TEU art. 20(2); TFEU art. 329(1). 
 39 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 1, most recently amended by Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1791/2006 of November 20, 2006, O.J. (L 363) 1, 12.20.2006), consolidated text at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1958R0001:20070101:EN: 
PDF. 
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Article 2 
 Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the 
jurisdiction of a Member State sends to institutions of the 
Community may be drafted in any one of the official languages 
selected by the sender.  The reply shall be drafted in the same 
language.40 
Article 3 
 Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a 
Member State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a 
Member State shall be drafted in the language of such State.41  
Article 4 
 Regulations and other documents of general application shall 
be drafted in the [four] official languages.42 
 
Article 5 
 
 The Official Journal of the Community shall be published in 
the [23] official languages.43 
The requirements set forth in Articles 1 through 5 are strict.  The ECJ 
recently held, for example, that a Community regulation—an act which by its 
nature is “directly applicable in all Member States” and can bind individuals 
in those states44—cannot be enforced against a citizen in the courts of a 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 2 (reflecting TFEU art. 20, 24 and CFR art. 41(4)).  
See supra Part II.  In fact, it was Article 2 of Regulation 1/58 that came first, and these newer 
Treaty provisions have simply confirmed the established principle at a higher level in the 
hierarchy of norms.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30(3), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (“When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to 
the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under 
article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with 
those of the latter treaty.”). 
 41 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 3. 
 42 Id. art. 4. 
 43 Id. art. 5 (emphasis added). 
 44 TFEU art. 288. 
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Member State if it has not yet been published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (Official Journal) in the language concerned.45  Under 
Article 297 of the TFEU, publication is a condition of the validity of a 
regulation.46  
The internal regime is not explicitly referred to in the TEU and the 
TFEU—it is more relaxed.  Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 provides that “[t]he 
institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which 
of the languages are to be used in specific cases.”47  However, the institutions 
have not made full use of this provision.  For example, there is nothing about 
internal working languages in the Commission’s Rules of Procedure,48 
although there is an indirect reference to such a possibility in the provisions 
implementing those rules.49  Of course, the internal workings of a relatively 
small body of appointed people (twenty-seven), whose meetings are not 
public, are different from those of an elected body of over 700 members, 
such as the Parliament, which meets in public session.50  Similarly, the 
factual linguistic position for a person appointed to a Union mandate for 
several years, such as members of the Commission, is also different from the 
position of someone who attends meetings as a member of the Council 
intermittently as part of the job of being a national minister and for whom 
                                                                                                                   
 45 See Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux sro v. Celní ředitelství Olomouc, 2007 E.C.R. I-10841 
(regarding enforceability where there was no translation into the language of a Member State). 
 46 TFEU art. 297(1). 
 47 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 6 (emphasis added). 
 48 EC Rules of Procedure of the Commission (EC) C (2000) 3614, 2000 O.J. (L 308) 26 
[hereinafter EC Rules of Procedure]. 
 49 Commission Decision 138/10, amending its Rules of Procedure, art. 17, 2010 O.J. (L 55) 
60 (EU) (referencing “the authentic language or languages” of the Commission).  The 
implementing rules provide that the documents to be considered at the Commission’s 
meetings are to be communicated to the Members in the language determined by the President 
(and also in the language(s) appropriate to the act concerned, taking account of any 
requirements as to publication and as to the languages to be used in relation to any addressee).  
Id. art. 17.  However, while no decision has been taken by the President concerning any such 
“internal” languages, this has not prevented a long-standing informal practice from arising, 
according to which, documents for the College of Commissioners are provided in English, 
French, and German.  See Jacqueline Mowbray, Language in the UN and EU: Linguistic 
Diversity As a Challenge for Multilateralism, 8 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 91, 98 (2010) (“[The] 
EU function[s] in a limited number of official languages, and with an even more limited 
number of de facto working languages. . . . [I]t seems that, in practice, offices within these 
organisations [sic] effectively function in one or two languages only.”). 
 50 European Parliament Rules of Procedure, 16th ed., Rule 96(2), 2005 O.J. (L 44) 1 
[hereinafter EP Rules of Procedure] (“Debates in Parliament shall be public.”). 
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knowledge of languages, or the ability to learn them, is not necessarily a part 
of that job.51  
As will be seen, the Council and the Parliament do refer to languages in 
their rules, but only to repeat, in substance, the rules of Regulation 1/58.  
None of this is surprising, since it is clearly a delicate matter for an 
institution bound by principles, such as those laid down in the Treaty 
provisions just quoted, to take a formal stance which might be interpreted as 
meaning that some official languages were more “important” than others.52  
On the other hand, and just as unsurprisingly, most institutions have certain 
internal practices on this matter, whose existence is clearly recorded in the 
case-law.53  This is not the place for an exhaustive account of those practices, 
but it may be useful to give some general indications.  
The Council’s internal rules provide, in relation to the Council itself, that 
it only deliberates and decides on the basis of texts in conformity with the 
language rules in force (i.e., Regulation 1/58), subject to exceptions in urgent 
cases if unanimously agreed.54  However, working groups and the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which do the preparatory work, 
have a pragmatic regime; COREPER operates only in English, French, and 
German,55 and some groups only in English and French.  The Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure provide that all its documents are to be drafted in all the 
official languages and that any member may speak in any official language 
of his or her choice, and that interpretation will be provided into all the other 
                                                                                                                   
 51 See Mowbray, supra note 49, at 101 (“While major decision-making within [EU] 
institutions takes place at the intergovernmental level, the daily decision-making and work of 
these organisations is carried out by their employees.  As a result, language requirements for 
appointment dramatically influence who is able to participate.”). 
 52 See Jonathan Yim, Case Note, Feasibility of the Language Policy of the European Union, 
41 INT’L LAW. 127, 132–33 (2007) (noting that the EU multilingual regime has been described 
as “politically explosive” and “highly sensitive”). 
 53 See Stella Burch Elias, Regional Minorities, Immigrants and Migrants: The Reframing of 
Minority Language Rights in Europe, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 261, 297–99 (2010) (finding 
that the ECJ is disassociating linguistic rights with membership in particular linguistic groups 
and rather applying it to all individuals). 
 54 Council Decision 2009/937, Adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, art. 14(1), O.J. 
(L 325) 44 (EU); Regulation 1/58, supra note 11. 
 55 See Coreper Paves the Way for Political Harmony, EUR. VOICE (May 2, 1996), http:// 
www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/coreper-paves-the-way-for-political-harmony/31173.  
aspx (noting the “unwritten requirement for Coreper membership is proficiency in either English, 
French or German”). 
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official languages.56  Applying this regime apparently accounts annually for 
more than a third of the Parliament’s running costs, with over 1,000,000 
pages translated per year.57  The Parliament has virtually no simplified 
internal language rules amongst its members.  On the other hand, 
Parliament’s permanent officials tend to use a limited range of languages 
amongst themselves, for internal communication, essentially French and 
English.  
The language situation is different in the Commission, given its more 
administrative character.  The European Commission’s Rules of Procedure 
are silent on languages so that, formally speaking, Regulation 1/58 applies.58  
Indeed it is that strict regime which applies in the Commission’s external 
dealings.  Moreover, it is even possible for citizens to deal with the 
Commission in the “additional” languages enjoying official status in Spain.59 
On the other hand, in its role as instigator of legislation, the Commission 
must prepare reports, proposals, or other documents, which must be drafted 
internally in a given language.  It is apparent from the Commission’s 
translation statistics that only two languages (French and English) are 
generally used for drafting texts.60 
The ECJ is a special case.  Article 342 of the TFEU,61 as demonstrated 
earlier, is without prejudice to the Court’s Rules of Procedure.  Article 342 
                                                                                                                   
 56 EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 50, rule 138 (1)–(2).  However, slightly more relaxed 
rules than those that govern the E.U. Parliament may apply by agreement to committee or 
delegation meetings.  Id. rule 138(4).   
 57 The Budget of the European Parliament, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.e 
uropa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=153&language=EN (last visited Aug. 20, 
2011) (“[I]n 2008 over 1.5 million pages of documents were translated.”).   
 58 See EC Rules of Procedure, supra note 48 (lacking guidance on language rules 
throughout). 
 59 Administrative Agreement Between the European Commission and the Kingdom of 
Spain, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (C 73) 14.  For example, Spanish people can address written 
communications with the Commission in Basque or Catalan.  See Robert F. Weber, Individual 
Rights and Group Rights in the European Community’s Approach to Minority Languages, 17 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 361, 368–69 (2007). 
 60 Seventy-five percent of texts are originally drafted in English and twenty-four percent in 
French, according to Ludwig Krämer in LANGUES ET CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE 99 
(Dominik Hanf et al. eds., 2010). 
 61 TFEU art. 342 (“The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Union shall, 
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously by means of 
regulations.”).  There are now three separate Rules of Procedure, one for each Union 
jurisdiction: (i) the ECJ Rules of Procedure, (ii) the GC Rules of Procedure (formerly the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance), and (iii) the CST Rules of Procedure.  See 
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thus implicitly envisages the concept of “procedural languages” to be used in 
the Court, which could be different from those which the Council has 
designated as official for all other purposes.62  The Court is left free to 
determine for itself the procedural languages which may be used in cases 
before it.63  In fact, however, the Court’s list is exactly the same as that 
provided in Regulation 1/58.64  Therefore, cases may be brought or referred 
in any of the official languages.  Article 64 of the Statute of the Court 
provides: 
 The rules governing the language arrangements applicable at 
the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be laid down 
by a regulation of the Council acting unanimously.  This 
regulation shall be adopted either at the request of the Court of 
Justice and after consultation of the Commission and the 
European Parliament, or on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consultation of the Court of Justice and of the 
European Parliament. 
 Until those rules have been adopted, the provisions of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the Rules of 
Procedure of the General Court governing language 
arrangements shall continue to apply.  By way of derogation 
from Articles 253 and 254 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, those provisions may only be amended or 
repealed with the unanimous consent of the Council.65 
Article 29(1) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure states: “[t]he language of 
a case shall be Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, 
French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish or 
                                                                                                                   
Consolidated Version of the Rules of Procedure of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal 
art. 2(1), 2010 O.J. (C 177) 71 [hereinafter CST Rules of Procedure]. 
 62 TFEU art. 342.  
 63 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, art. 29, 2010 O.J. (C 177) [hereinafter ECJ 
Rules of Procedure], available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/20 
11-07/rp_cjue_en.pdf (including the updated, consolidated version that takes into account 
changes up to and including May 2011). 
 64 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 1. 
 65 TEU, Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art. 
64, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 210 [hereinafter Statute of the European Court of Justice]. 
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Swedish.”66  Article 35(1) of the General Court’s Rules of Procedure is 
identical, and Article 29 of the Civil Service Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 
makes that Article applicable to the Civil Service Tribunal (CST).67 
However, these provisions are manifestations of the external regime—the 
Court allows all Member States and their citizens to use their official Union 
languages in cases before it.68  Internally, however, the case must be 
deliberated, and at an early stage, the Court adopted the practice of using 
French for the deliberations amongst the judges.  French remains the 
dominant language within the institution.69  The Rules of Procedure of all 
three courts provide that the court may request any institution which is party 
to a case to provide “translations” of its pleadings into other official 
languages.70  In practice, however, no translation is requested if the 
procedural language is French.  
IV.  CASES ON THE EXTERNAL LANGUAGE REGIME 
Many of the cases examined in this Article concern recruitment of staff 
by the institutions.  Nevertheless, some of the most important judicial 
statements on this matter were made by the ECJ in Kik v. Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) (Kik).71  This case concerned 
the external regime; in other words, dealings between the Office and a 
Community citizen.  In Kik, a citizen applied to OHIM for a mark to be 
registered under the Community trademark legislation.72  The trademark 
legislation lays down an very specific language regime.  The applicant can 
file in any official language, but must indicate a second language for possible 
                                                                                                                   
 66 ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 63, art. 29(1).  Consolidated Version of the Rules of 
Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, 2010 (C 177) 37 [hereinafter GC Rules of 
Procedure].   
 67 GC Rules of Procedure, supra note 66, art. 35(1); CST Rules of Procedure, supra note 
61, art. 29. 
 68 ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 63, art. 29(2) 
 69 Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences?  The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties, 
20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 618 (1997) (noting that all of the Court’s documents 
are written in French, and then translated into other languages). 
 70 ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 63, art. 37(2); GC Rules of Procedure, supra note 66, 
art. 43(2); CST Rules of Procedure, supra note 61, art. 34(2). 
 71 Case C-361/01 P, Kik v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283. 
 72 Council Regulation 40/94, Community Trademark, art. 115, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 
[hereinafter OHIM Trademark Legislation] (providing guidance as to the use of languages in 
an application for a Community trademark). 
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use in opposition proceedings.73  This secondary language must be one of the 
five languages of OHIM (English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian).74  
Moreover, if the application is not in one of these languages, OHIM may 
communicate with the applicant in the second language that he or she 
indicated.75  In Kik, a Dutch national submitted an application in Dutch but 
indicated Dutch as the second language.76  She contested a decision 
dismissing the application for not complying with the obligation to indicate 
one of the five OHIM languages as a second language.77  The case was 
dismissed by the Court of First Instance (CFI) and her heirs appealed to the 
ECJ.78  They argued in particular that the restriction of the number of 
possible second languages was contrary to what is now Article 18 of the 
TFEU, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality.79  The 
Court rejected this submission, observing: 
[T]he Treaty contains several references to the use of languages 
in the European Union.  None the less, those references cannot 
be regarded as evidencing a general principle of Community 
law that confers a right on every citizen to have a version of 
anything that might affect his interests drawn up in his 
language in all circumstances.80  
The Court considered the particular circumstances of the Community 
trademark regime, especially noting that the regime was voluntary and one in 
which competing interests with different language preferences (for example, 
the applicant for registration and a third party opposing registration) could be 
involved.81  The Court referred to the interest of economic operators in 
having access to a common regime which would reduce the cost and effort, 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. art. 115(3) (“The applicant must indicate a second language which shall be a 
languages of the [OHIM] the use of which he accepts as possible language of proceedings for 
opposition, revocation or validity proceedings.”). 
 74 Id. art. 115(2). 
 75 Id. art. 115(6). 
 76 Kik, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283, para. 9(6). 
 77 Id. paras. 9(7)–(8). 
 78 Id. paras. 18–20. 
 79 Id. paras. 26–28. 
 80 Id. para. 82. 
 81 Id. paras. 86, 88. 
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particularly in the form of translation costs, of applying for individual 
national registrations.82  It concluded: 
[T]he language regime of a body such as the Office is the result 
of a difficult process which seeks to achieve the necessary 
balance between the interests of economic operators and the 
public interest in terms of the cost of proceedings, but also 
between the interests of applicants for Community trade marks 
and those of other economic operators in regard to access to 
translations of documents which confer rights, or proceedings 
involving more than one economic operator, such as 
opposition, revocation and invalidity proceedings.83  
 The Court of First Instance was therefore right to 
find . . . that, in determining the official languages of the 
Community which may be used as languages of proceedings in 
opposition, revocation and invalidity proceedings . . . where the 
parties cannot agree on which language to use, the Council was 
pursuing the legitimate aim of seeking an appropriate linguistic 
solution to the difficulties arising from such a failure to agree.84   
 Similarly, the Court of First Instance was right to 
hold . . . that, even if the Council did treat official languages of 
the Community differently, its choice to limit the languages to 
those which are most widely known in the European 
Community is appropriate and proportionate.85 
The reference to “the most widely known languages” is naturally 
problematic—“most” is a word capable of qualification, and the question can 
thus arise as to what legal consequences follow when the word is qualified 
by inserting a number before it.  Kik concerned a rule adopted by the 
Council, for a specific purpose, which referred to the five most widely-
known languages.86  But what if the number were four?  Which language 
drops out, and why?  Three—but which three?  Two, or . . . one?  Which—
and why?  As pointed out above, it was when a three-language regime was 
proposed for the future Union patent that there was opposition.  And who 
                                                                                                                   
 82 Id. para. 91. 
 83 Id. para. 92. 
 84 Id. para. 93. 
 85 Id. para. 94 (emphasis added). 
 86 Id. para 12. 
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decides?  Is it the Council, unanimously under Article 342 of the TFEU or 
Article 118 of the TFEU?  Or can each institution decide for itself, for its 
own internal purposes?  As we shall see, the answer is that sometimes it is 
one, sometimes the other, according to the nature of the act in issue.  If the 
question is limiting the number of languages in which the institutions 
communicate with citizens, only a unanimous Council act can provide the 
basis.87  If the question is how the institutions, or a newly-created Union 
body, communicate with those who want a service from them, such as a 
property right, the Council again must act unanimously.88  However, the fact 
that the requirement of unanimity appears in a different legal basis 
(Article 118 of the TFEU) from the basis for the general language regime 
(Article 342 of the TFEU) is a clear sign that the language regime may be 
different from the general regime. 
Based on these principles, the Court upheld the judgment of the lower 
court and declared that Regulation 1/58 does not contain a general principle 
of Community law:89 
Regulation No 1 is merely an act of secondary law, whose legal 
base is Article 21790 of the Treaty.  To claim, as the applicant 
does, that Regulation No 1 sets out a specific Community law 
principle of equality between languages, which may not be 
derogated from even by a subsequent regulation of the Council, 
is tantamount to disregarding its character as secondary law.  
Secondly, the Member States did not lay down rules governing 
languages in the Treaty for the institutions and bodies of the 
Community; rather, Article 217 of the Treaty enables the 
Council, acting unanimously, to define and amend the rules 
governing the languages of the institutions and to establish 
different language rules.  That Article does not provide that 
once the Council has established such rules they cannot 
subsequently be altered.  It follows that the rules governing 
                                                                                                                   
 87 TFEU art. 342. 
 88 Id. art. 118. 
 89 See generally Antoni Milian-Massana, Droit Linguistique Compare: Le Régime Juridique 
du Multilinguisme dans 1’Union Européene. Le Mythe ou la Réalité du Principe d’Égalité des 
Langues, 38 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 1 (2004), available at http://www.editionsthemis.com/up 
loaded/revue/article/rjtvol38num1/05-Milian-Massana.pdf. 
 90 TFEU art. 324 (e.g., EC Treaty art. 217). 
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languages laid down by Regulation No 1 cannot be deemed to 
amount to a principle of Community law.91 
There is no inconsistency between this position, in Kik, and that taken by 
the Court in the Skoma-Lux (Skoma-Lux) case.92  Skoma-Lux concerned the 
question of whether a Community regulation could apply to a person, 
possibly to his detriment, if it had not been published in the relevant official 
language.93  While a person must be presumed to know the law, this 
presupposes that it is available to him in his own language.94  Kik, on the 
other hand, concerns a customer for a service.95  Kik is not a case of 
unilaterally applying a rule against a person’s will, on pain of criminal 
penalties.  Moreover, in Kik, it was the legislature which laid down the 
restricted language regime,96 inter alia, to take account of the fact that other 
parties (whose language preferences might be different from the applicant’s) 
might also be involved, for example, by opposing the application.  This was 
not a case of a mere administrative act or practice concerning choice of 
language.  The courts naturally recognize that the legislature has wide 
discretion in such matters, much wider than would necessarily be recognized 
in the case of a purely decisional act.97 
V.  THE UNION STAFF REGULATIONS 
In a number of cases brought by Union officials, or by candidates for 
recruitment as officials, the courts have been pragmatic about the use of 
particular official languages inside the institutions, notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Case C-361/01 P, Kik v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283, para. 16 (emphasis added).  
 92 Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux v. Celní ředitelství Olomouc, 2007 E.C.R. I-10841. 
 93 Id. para. 1. 
 94 Id. para. 41 (“[I]t would be contra legem . . . to require [Member States] to impose on 
individuals obligations contained in legislation of general application which is not 
published . . . in the official language of those States.”). 
 95 Kik, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283.  In arguments, OHIM suggested that by making the application, 
the applicant was implicitly consenting to the language regime.  Id. para. 36.  The Court 
confirmed this view: “Account must also be taken of the fact that the Community trade mark 
was created for the benefit not of all citizens, but of economic operators, and that economic 
operators are not under any obligation to make use of it.”  Id. para. 88. 
 96 Id. para. 94. 
 97 See Case C-443/07 P, Centeno Mediavilla v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-10945 (confirming 
legislative discretion in relation to the choice of transitional provisions). 
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absence of any formal legal basis for such practices, such as a decision under 
Article 6 of Regulation 1/58.98  
To assist in understanding these cases, it is perhaps useful to begin by 
indicating what rules govern the employment of Union staff.  For permanent 
officials, the relevant rules are set out in the Staff Regulations of Officials of 
the European Union (SR or Staff Regulations).99  The Conditions of 
Employment of Other Servants (CEOS or Conditions of Employment), 
which are part of the Staff Regulations, lay down the rules applicable to 
temporary staff and contract agents.100  These categories of staff are 
employed on contracts, which may be for a fixed term or indefinite.101  
The SR/CEOS apply to the vast majority of Union staff.  They apply to 
those employed by the “historic” institutions (i.e., the Parliament, the ECJ, 
the Council, the Commission, and the Court of Auditors), those employed by 
Community organizations, (i.e., the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions), and those who work for more recently created 
organizations (i.e., the European Ombudsman and the European Data 
Protection Supervisor).  The Lisbon Treaty and a consequential amendment 
of the SR/CEOS have added a new organization to those covered by the 
SR/CEOS, namely the new European External Action Service, which is 
under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy.102  Article 1 of the Staff Regulations makes them applicable 
to “officials”, which, in the absence of qualification would mean “officials” 
of the institutions as defined in the TEU and TFEU; however, Article 1b 
extends their scope, by deeming the newer bodies just mentioned to be 
institutions for the purposes of the Staff Regulations, so that these 
                                                                                                                   
 98 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 6. 
 99 European Commission: “Legal Issues and Questions Relating to the Staff Regulations” 
Unit, COMPENDIUM OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS OF OFFICIALS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
& THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER SERVANTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES II-3 
(2004) [hereinafter STAFF REGULATIONS], available at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/to 
c100_en.pdf. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at I-4, II-3.  The Staff Regulations apply to “officials” of the European Communities, 
while the Conditions of Employment apply to temporary, auxiliary, contract, and local staff.  
Id. 
 102 About the EEAS, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, http://eeas.europa.eu/backgrou 
nd/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011); European Parliament and Council Regulation 
1080/2010, Amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and 
the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, 2010 O.J. (L 311) 1. 
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Regulations can apply to bodies which are not “institutions” under the 
Treaties.103  
The final category is Union agencies: small bodies that carry out 
specialized functions which either result from a new Union “competence” or 
which have been devolved from the Commission.104  There are currently over 
thirty agencies dealing with matters as diverse as coordinating the fight 
against organized crime, promotion of vocational training, air transport 
safety, food safety, and registration of chemicals.105  Article 1a(2) of the SR 
provides that, where the founding act of the agency so provides, the 
SR/CEOS also apply to agencies, which are also assimilated to institutions 
for the purposes of the SR/CEOS.106 
The only significant exceptions to these rules are the two banking 
institutions—the European Investment Bank and the European Central Bank. 
Given their specialized functions, and since they must compete on the 
employment market with commercial banks, each of these bodies has its own 
Staff Regulations, which differ in several respects from the SR/CEOS.107  
The cases discussed below concern the extent to which the language rules 
in the Treaty and in Regulation 1/58 apply or do not apply inside the 
institutions and other bodies whose staff are governed by the SR/CEOS.  
This case law is not directly transposable to bodies which apply other rules, 
such as the two banks, which have their own internal language practices.108   
The basic language requirements for officials are set out in Article 28 of 
the SR: “An official may be appointed only on condition that . . . (f) he 
produces evidence of a thorough knowledge of one of the languages of the 
Communities and of a satisfactory knowledge of another language of the 
                                                                                                                   
 103 STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99, at I-4. 
 104 See Alexandra Gatto, Governance in the European Union: A Legal Perspective, 12 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 487, 505 (2006) (describing the function of agencies as a response to 
regulatory needs).   
 105 Id., at 505 nn.87–90. 
 106 STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99, at I-4. 
 107 See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR STAFF OF THE 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2011), available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/jobs/pdf/conditions_o 
f_employment.pdf?4f202f4b95e1c0504e114c2abf3b994a; EUROPEAN INV. BANK, STAFF 
REGULATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (2009), available at http://www.eib.org/at 
tachments/general/eib_staff_regulations_2009_en.pdf. 
 108 See, e.g., EUROPEAN INV. BANK, CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR STAFF OF THE 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 107 (stating that the two banks do not contain explicit 
language requirements, but in practice most published vacancy notices require a high standard 
in English). 
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Communities to the extent necessary for the performance of his duties.”109  
The rules in the CEOS on this matter are the same.110 
The context of these requirements is given by both Article 27 of the SR 
and Article 12 of the CEOS: “Recruitment shall be directed to securing for 
the institution the services of persons of the highest standard of ability, 
efficiency and integrity, recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis 
from among nationals of the Member States of the Communities.”111  
It is important to note, however, that like the other conditions for 
recruitment (e.g., educational qualifications and professional experience), 
these are only minimum requirements and the institutions may always 
impose more severe requirements “in the interest of the service” (i.e., where 
it is objectively justified by the nature of the post or posts to be filled, or 
more generally by the factual circumstances within the institution).112  So far 
as languages are concerned, an institution is free to require, for example, a 
satisfactory knowledge of not just one other Community language, but of 
two or three others, or even more.113  Likewise, it may impose a higher 
standard for the second language than just a satisfactory knowledge.114  It 
may require that the “primary” language be a particular language, or it may 
require satisfactory (or greater) knowledge of a particular language as a 
second, third, etc., so long as this is objectively necessary “in the interest of 
the service.”115  Sometimes a certain condition has the effect that those 
recruited are primarily or exclusively speakers of a particular language.  If, 
for example, there is a need for Dutch lawyers in particular, a condition 
requiring a qualification in Dutch law is legitimate, despite its exclusionary 
                                                                                                                   
 109 STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99, art. 28, I-14. 
 110 Id. art. 12(2)(e), I-6; id. art. 82(3)(e), II-26. 
 111 Id. art. 27, I-14.  For the CEOS version, see id. art. 12, II-6. 
 112 This right for institutions has been confirmed in many staff cases, in particular as to 
language requirements, for example, Case 108/88, Jaenicke Cendoya v. Comm’n, 1989 
E.C.R. 2711, para. 24; Case T-73/01, Pappas v. Comm. of the Regions, 2003 E.C.R. II-1011, 
para. 85; Case T-376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, paras. 36–39. 
 113 Competitions for translators normally require knowledge of two or three official 
languages in addition to one’s primary language, and sometimes knowledge of certain 
specified languages.   
 114 Thus, for example, if Italian interpreters or translators are needed, it is not merely 
legitimate, but rather essential to require that the language of which one has “thorough” 
knowledge be Italian and no other.  In practice, interpreters’ competitions normally require not 
only mother-tongue standard in one language, but a similar level in at least one other.   
 115 For example, the requirement cannot simply be an artifice to reduce the numbers of 
applicants, still less can the intention be to give an arbitrary advantage to particular languages 
or nationalities (which would be unlawful). 
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effects.116  It will be readily appreciated that this concept of the “interest of 
the service,” which is peculiar to the SR and CEOS, allows a different and 
far more flexible approach to language rules than is possible under the strict 
external regime described above.117  This case law has grown independently 
of Article 6 of Regulation 1/58, which only refers to the potential content of 
the institutions’ internal rules.  Those rules do not, in any case, provide for 
any particular internal language regime.  The following cases involve the 
recognition of the primacy of the SR/CEOS, as lex specialis, over the 
external rules.  Thus, they make a clear distinction between internal and 
external situations.  
Save perhaps for certain specialist jobs, the linguistic “interest of the 
service” evidenced in the recruitment process is twofold and, in fact, reflects 
the internal/external distinction within Regulation 1/58.  On the one hand, the 
institutions aim, as far as is practicable, to have staff members representative 
of every Member State nationality to comply with their employment 
obligations under Article 27 of the SR and their linguistic obligations under 
the TEU and the TFEU and Regulation 1/58.  To communicate externally in 
every official language at a mother-tongue standard, a mix of staff is a 
necessity.  On the other hand, these staff members must also communicate 
effectively with each other within the institution.  For this purpose, there is 
an inevitable factual convergence on certain widely-known languages, which 
are used as “vehicular languages,” because they are the most widely-taught 
second languages throughout the Union.  The existence of this factual 
situation makes it necessary, particularly at a time when the number of 
official languages has virtually doubled,118 to make a satisfactory knowledge 
                                                                                                                   
 116 This example is especially significant: first, there is no prohibited indirect discrimination 
in favor of Dutch Nationals or Dutch-speakers, since the requirement is objectively justified 
by the need to recruit people qualified in Dutch law; any exclusionary effect is the inevitable 
secondary consequence of a legitimate need, which must be accepted.  Second, the difference 
is not based on language, since Dutch-speaking Belgians would not qualify either (unless their 
qualification happened to be in Dutch rather than Belgian law). 
 117 See supra Part III (discussing Regulation 1/58 and language practices in the institutions). 
 118 Official EU Languages, supra note 13.  From 1958–1972, there were four official 
languages: French, German, Dutch, and Italian.  The first enlargement added English and 
Danish (and nearly added Norwegian).  The next brought Greek, in 1981.  Then came Spanish 
and Portuguese, in 1986.  The 1995 enlargement added Finnish and Swedish (and once more 
nearly added Norwegian).  These eleven languages were official until 2004, when ten Member 
States joined, all but one of which brought a new official language.  The 2007 accession, and 
the declaration by Ireland of Irish as an official Union language, brought the number of 
official languages to 23.  See 1958 O.J. (17) 385; 1972 O.J. (L 73) 14; 1979 O.J. (L 291) 17; 
1985 O.J. (L 302) 23; 1994 O.J. (C 241) 21; 2003 O.J. (L 236) 33; 2006 O.J. (L 363) 1. 
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of one or more of these common languages a condition of recruitment.  It is 
precisely this kind of recruitment condition which has led to many of the 
cases we shall now consider.  
VI.  CASES ON THE INTERNAL LANGUAGE REGIME 
When we refer to an internal regime, we are discussing only how the 
institutions organize their everyday work.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the 
cases brought in the last ten years that this is perceived as institutionally 
significant, at least when it results in something being written down and 
published officially.  In the past, when there were fewer Member States and 
fewer official languages, there was no perceived need to specify knowledge 
of particular languages as a requirement for recruitment of officials.  The 
question tended to resolve itself as candidates for recruitment almost always 
had as their second or third language at least one of the languages used as a 
de facto working language in the institutions.  The sudden and enormous 
increase in the number of Member States and of official languages in 2004 
changed all that.  
The case law concerning vacancy notices, competition notices (for 
recruitment of officials), and notices of selection procedures (for temporary 
agents and contract agents) rightly requires that the notice state, with the 
greatest possible precision, all the essential conditions for admission to the 
particular competition or selection/vacancy procedure.119  It thus became 
inevitable that what is necessary for effective communication, especially 
internal communication, had to be set out, so that potential candidates could 
know, in light of their own linguistic abilities, if there was any point in 
applying.  What had until then been an open secret became an official policy, 
set out in official publications such as competition notices.  While the 
purpose of such a notice is purely internal—to recruit candidates who have 
the qualifications the institutions need—setting out such matters officially for 
the first time cannot pass unnoticed.  It was not long before some Member 
States, feeling that certain fundamental principles and assumptions were at 
stake, reacted. 
                                                                                                                   
 119 See, e.g., Case T-146/99, Teixeira Neves v. Court of Justice, 2000 E.C.R. II-731, paras. 
34–36. 
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A.  Court of First Instance Cases 2000–2005 
The first four cases considered in this Article are direct actions brought, 
not by Member States, but by officials or candidates, who took issue with the 
communication of documents in an official language other than the language 
they wished to see used.  
In Rudolph v. Commission, the CFI was faced with the question of 
whether an official could impose the use of a particular language on the 
institution, by making a complaint in that language.120  Was the institution 
then required to reply in that language?  The answer is no: the institution 
may reply in any appropriate official language, provided the official has 
sufficient knowledge of it to understand the reply.121  In the event of a 
dispute, the burden of proof as to this degree of knowledge is on the 
institution.122  It thus appears that Article 2 of Regulation 1/58,123 Article 
41(4) of the CFR,124 and Article 24 of the TFEU125 do not apply to internal 
communications between the institution and its officials.  This flexible rule 
applies not only to existing staff, but to candidates for recruitment.  In 
Bonaiti Brighina v. Commission, the CFI held that a candidate could not 
oblige the institution to conduct correspondence in his or her mother tongue 
if the institution preferred to use another official language known to the 
candidate.126  Interestingly, the CFI referred to Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 
in this case.  Even though the Commission had not (and still has not) adopted 
an internal decision applying it, the mere existence of Article 6 confirms that 
the institutions can lawfully have internal linguistic practices, such as using 
certain widely-known languages for internal communication.  
In Hendrickx v. Council, the CFI accepted as self-evident that it was 
justifiable for the General Secretariat of the Council to require, in an internal 
competition notice, that candidates have a satisfactory knowledge of French 
and English “for functional reasons.”127  This is a reference to the long-
                                                                                                                   
 120 See Case T-197/98, Rudolph v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-241, paras. 34–47.  This 
question is repeated in subsequent cases, not only those discussed below, e.g., Case T-95/04, 
Lavagnoli v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. II-A-2-569, para. 48. 
 121 Rudolph, 2000 E.C.R. II-241, para. 46. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 2. 
 124 CFR art. 41(4). 
 125 TFEU art. 24. 
 126 Case T-118/99, Bonaiti Brighina v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-97, paras. 12–17. 
 127 Case T-376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, para 33. 
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standing internal practice of the Council, in which internal communication is 
in one or another of these languages.  
In Rasmussen v. Commission, the CFI applied Rudolph and confirmed 
explicitly that Regulation 1/58 does not apply in relations between officials 
and their institution.128  The institution may use other official languages, 
provided they allow the official to readily understand the communications in 
question, which in Rasmussen was material in a disciplinary procedure.129  
B.  The Opinion in Eurojust 
The most exhaustive discussion of language requirements so far 
attempted is to be found in the Opinion of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro 
in Spain v. Eurojust (Eurojust).130  This case concerned a number of notices 
calling for expressions of interest which were published in the Official 
Journal by a new Union body set up to promote judicial cooperation.131  This 
would create reserve lists for the hiring of temporary staff to fill certain 
posts.132  For all but one of these posts, the notices required either a 
satisfactory or excellent knowledge of English, and some positions also 
required French to the same standard.133  For certain posts, knowledge of 
other official languages as well was an advantage, but not a condition.134  
There were also procedural linguistic requirements: while the application 
form could be submitted in any official language, it also had to be submitted 
in English, and the accompanying curriculum vitae/resume and “motivation 
letter” (explaining why they wanted the job and why they thought they were 
qualified for it) also had to be in English.135  Spain attacked both the 
substantive and the procedural conditions, asking for the notices to be 
annulled to the extent that they: (a) imposed a requirement to know English 
(and in some cases French) and (b) required the use of English in the 
application.136  It put forward three grounds of annulment: (i) infringement of 
Article 12 of the CEOS, because the requirements supposedly went beyond 
                                                                                                                   
 128 Case T-203/03, Rasmussen v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-1287, para 60. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2077. 
 131 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, Setting Up Eurojust with a View to Reinforcing the 
Fight Against Serious Crime, 2002 O.J. (L 63) 1 (EU). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2077, paras. 19–20. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. para. 20. 
 136 Id. para. 1. 
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the minimum required; (ii) infringement of Eurojust’s language rules which 
were those of Regulation 1/58; and (iii) infringement of Article 12 of the EC 
(now Article 18 of the TFEU), prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, since the conditions allegedly favored those whose primary 
language was English or French.137  
The Advocate-General begins, in paragraphs 34–37, by putting language 
requirements in context: 
the question of linguistic requirements does not fall solely 
within the scope of regulations or specific Treaty provisions.  
This question must be linked with rights, with a principle and 
with an objective which are fundamental to the European 
Union.  It is important to bear in mind in that connection that 
respect for and promotion of linguistic diversity are not in any 
way incompatible with the objective of the common market.  
On the contrary, against the background of a Community based 
on the free movement of persons, ‘the protection of the 
linguistic rights and privileges of individuals is of particular 
importance.’138  It is common ground that the right of a national 
of the Union to use his own language is conducive to his 
exercise of the right of free movement and his integration into 
the host state.  In those circumstances, the Court condemns all 
forms of indirect discrimination based on knowledge of 
languages.   
 In a Union intended to be an area of freedom, security and 
justice, in which it is sought to establish a society characterised 
by pluralism, respect for linguistic diversity is of fundamental 
importance.  That is an aspect of the respect which the Union 
owes, in the terms of Article 6(3) EU, to the national identities 
of the Member States.  The principle of respect for linguistic 
diversity has also been expressly upheld by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and by the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe.  That principle is a 
specific expression of the plurality inherent in the European 
Union.  
                                                                                                                   
 137 Id. paras. 21–24. 
 138 This statement references Case C-137/84, Ministère Pub. v. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681, 
para. 11. 
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. . . . 
Language is not merely a functional means of social 
communication.  It is an essential attribute of personal identity 
and, at the same time, a fundamental component of national 
identity.   
 In my opinion, the language regime of the Union institutions 
must not be severed from that context or from that principle.  
That regime guarantees that the linguistic rights of those 
individuals who have direct access to the Union institutions 
will be recognised.  It stems from the special nature of the 
relationship between the Union and its citizens.  It must 
therefore be regarded as a direct expression of the linguistic 
diversity inherent in the European Union.  It thus constitutes a 
fundamental institutional rule of the European Union.139 
The Advocate-General recognized that this rule must be qualified because 
of Kik.  However, any such exceptions to “fundamental institutional rules” 
must be narrow and subject to an obligation of express justification in every 
case.140  The principle of linguistic diversity cannot be regarded as absolute: 
“it is necessary to accept restrictions in practice, in order to reconcile 
observance of that principle with the imperatives of institutional and 
administrative life.”141  The Advocate-General then makes the crucial 
distinction between the internal and the external regimes.142  He sees three 
situations—two external, one internal.143  The first external situation is 
communication between an institution and citizens.144  This deserves the 
“highest level of protection” since it is linked to democratic participation in 
the Union.145  The strict regime of Regulation 1/58 applies.  The second 
external situation is “relations between citizens and the administration,” 
                                                                                                                   
 139 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust 2005 
ECR I-2077, paras. 34–37 [hereinafter Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro] (citations omitted), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=49769&pageIndex=0& 
doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&cid=278038. 
 140 Id. para. 50 (“[I]t is not sufficient to seek to justify an internal language regime by 
reference to ‘the nature of things,’ as Eurojust saw fit to do before the Court.”).  Despite these 
strictures, it seems as if that was exactly what the GC is prepared to accept.  See Case T-
376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, para. 33. 
 141 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139, para. 40. 
 142 Id. paras. 40–49. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. para. 43. 
 145 Id. 
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which refers to participation in administrative procedures.146  Here, the 
Advocate-General suggests that it may be possible if circumstances so 
require to derogate from the rule that everything happens in the citizen’s own 
language, but any such derogation requires a legal basis adopted by the 
Council under what is now Article 342 of the TFEU (or Article 118 of the 
TFEU).147  This is a reference to the situation in cases such as Kik.  On the 
other hand, the first external situation corresponds to that in the subsequent 
Skoma-Lux case. 
The internal situation is quite different.  Referring to Article 6 of 
Regulation 1/58, the Advocate-General states: 
Whilst linguistic diversity is the fundamental rule in the context 
of outside contacts, that is because it is necessary to respect the 
linguistic rights of persons having access to Union institutions 
and bodies.  The Treaty and the case-law are based on the 
understanding that the choice of the language of 
communication is a matter for the Member State or the person 
who has a relationship with the institutions.  On the other hand, 
in the context of the internal functioning of Union institutions, 
the choice of the language to be used for internal 
communications is the responsibility of those institutions, 
which are entitled to impose that choice on their employees. 
 . . . . 
 However, that autonomy must be strictly circumscribed.  It 
can be exercised only within the limits allowed by the Treaty 
[which] entrusts principally to the Council the responsibility of 
defining the language regime of the Union institutions.  That 
responsibility implies a considerable degree of latitude, 
provided that it does not in any way undermine the essence of 
the principle of linguistic diversity.  In contrast, the Union 
institutions and bodies enjoy only a limited discretion for 
implementation of that regime.  They must not be allowed to 
use it otherwise than for the purposes of their internal 
operational needs.   
 In those circumstances, the choice of one or more Union 
languages for internal purposes can be allowed only if it is 
                                                                                                                   
 146 Id. para. 44. 
 147 Id. 
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based on objective considerations relating to the functional 
needs of the body concerned and if it does not give rise to 
unjustified differences of treatment as between Union citizens.  
It is important to make certain, first, that the regime chosen 
reflects the specific needs of the body concerned, having 
regard, for example, to the history of its coming into being, the 
location of its seat, its internal communication needs and the 
nature of the functions which it must discharge.  It is necessary 
to verify, secondly, that the choice made does not compromise 
equal access for Union citizens to the jobs offered by Union 
institutions and bodies.148 
The Advocate-General then applies these principles to the two issues 
before the Court; first the legality of the substantive conditions requiring 
knowledge of certain specified languages, then the procedural requirement to 
submit the application and supporting documents in English.149  Concerning 
the substantive requirements, in the light of his conclusion that a limited 
internal language regime requires specific justification, the Advocate-
General considers the justifications put forward by Eurojust: (a) the need to 
know Eurojust’s working languages (or more generally, the need for 
effective internal communication), and (b) the nature of the duties of the 
particular posts.150   
As to (a), “it is beyond doubt . . . that it may be necessary to choose an 
internal working language in order to ensure the proper functioning of Union 
institutions and bodies.  Such a choice is particularly legitimate where the 
body in question is a specialised organisation with limited resources.”151  The 
Advocate-General doubted, however, that this could justify the need to know 
two working languages, since “to ensure good communication within the 
organisation, command of a single common language would appear 
sufficient.  As long as all Eurojust’s employees are fluent in that language, it 
is clear that the requirement of a second working language cannot be 
justified for reasons of internal communications.”152  This did not preclude 
an institution from having more than one working language if its nature 
justified it, but even then it should be enough to require knowledge of just 
                                                                                                                   
 148 Id. para. 46, 48–49. 
 149 Id. para. 52. 
 150 Id. paras. 53–67. 
 151 Id. para. 55. 
 152 Id. 
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one of them: “the cumulative requirement of knowledge of several 
languages cannot be justified by internal communication needs and can only 
be indicative of a wish to afford a privileged status to certain Union 
languages.”153  On the facts of the case, justification (a) did not appear to 
have been made out, since it was not clear whether any one or more 
particular languages had actually been chosen as the means of internal 
communication, and Eurojust’s Rules of Procedure did not shed any light on 
the matter.154 
As to (b), the Advocate-General is more receptive to Eurojust’s 
arguments:  
[T]he nature of the proposed duties may justify requiring the 
command of a language other than the one used for internal 
communications within the organisation.  However, a measure 
laying down wider-ranging linguistic requirements than those 
appearing in the Conditions of Employment must not run 
counter to a fundamental principle such as the principle of 
non-discrimination.  Accordingly, linguistic requirements 
imposed by reason of the nature of the work to be undertaken 
must be strictly linked with the posts to be filled and they must 
not result in any dilution of the requirement of geographical 
diversity of Union staff.155    
It was thus necessary to see whether “the prescribed linguistic 
requirements display a necessary and direct connection with the proposed 
duties”156 and whether “the requirements decided upon do not excessively 
undermine the objective of ensuring a geographical balance within the Union 
institutions and the bodies.”157  The burden of proof was, however, on the 
                                                                                                                   
 153 Id. para. 56.  But see id. para. 44. 
 154 See id. para. 58 (confirming what the CFI had already held in Bonaiti Brighina, that 
notwithstanding the terms of Article 6 of Regulation 1/58, an internal working language 
regime can be validly established by some other decision or by mere practice, even if there is 
nothing in the Rules of Procedure). 
 155 Id. para. 61. 
 156 Id. para. 62 (“Should that link not be established, such requirements must be regarded as 
involving discrimination detrimental to Union nationals who have the necessary skills, within 
the meaning of Article 12 of the Conditions of Employment, to be appointed to the posts to be 
filled.”). 
 157 Id. para. 63 (“It is clear that preference for certain languages by way of professional 
requirements gives an advantage to those European citizens who have those languages as their 
mother tongues.  However, such an advantage is liable to give rise to indirect discrimination 
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party alleging that the conditions were indirectly discriminatory.158  Spain 
had not discharged its burden in this case, since (a) the evidence showed that 
in fact there was a balanced representation of nationalities in the selection 
procedures and in Eurojust generally, and (b) even if Eurojust’s explanations 
of the link between the language requirements and the duties of each post 
were not always clear, it was only where the condition was manifestly 
inappropriate that the courts should intervene, and this was not the case 
here.159 
Finally, there was the question of the procedural requirement: here, the 
Advocate-General seems once again to reason differently from the CFI.160  In 
Hendrickx, and in the recent Italian cases, the CFI holds to the line already 
taken in Bonaiti Brighina, that candidates in competitions are covered 
exclusively by the SR/CEOS.161  The rules in Regulation 1/58 (and even 
those in the TEU and the TFEU) concerning the “external” language regime 
simply do not apply.  The Advocate-General, on the other hand, assumes that 
Article 2 of Regulation 1/58 applies.162  Requiring candidates to submit an 
English version of their application form, and to submit supporting 
documents in English, is a derogation from the rule that citizens may address 
the institutions in any language.163  He looks for a justification for the 
exception.164  He recognizes that candidates in a selection procedure are not 
in the same position as citizens in general.165  This difference may justify 
treating the case differently, so long as the contested procedure is itself 
objective.  This will be the case if the requirement to use a given language in 
the procedure is “directly linked with the skills necessary for performance of 
the duties . . . and . . . does not have an excessive adverse impact on the legal 
interests of potential candidates.”166  The institution cannot therefore invoke 
mere organizational convenience, unless the requirement forces candidates 
                                                                                                                   
adversely affecting other Union citizens.  By virtue of the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, therefore, a linguistic requirement imposed in connection with the 
needs of the service must not to result in a vacant post being reserved for one or more 
specified nationalities.”). 
 158 Id. para. 64. 
 159 Id. paras. 65–67. 
 160 Id. paras. 68–73. 
 161 See supra Part VI.A (discussing the cases on the internal language regime in the Court of 
First Instance from 2000–2005). 
 162 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139, para. 68. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. para. 69. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
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into a practical demonstration of language skills that they would need for the 
post.167  This requirement can be justified because there is a link with the 
objective requirements of the post.168  In this case, the candidates could 
check for themselves exactly what the requirements of the job were, since all 
of the notices had been published in all the Union languages in the Official 
Journal.169 
The Advocate-General concluded that Spain’s application should be 
rejected, save as to one of the posts, for a librarian/archivist, where no clear 
link between the duties of the post and the requirement to submit the 
application documents in English were provided.170  Given the completeness 
of this analysis, it is regrettable that the Court did not, in the end, decide on 
these matters at all.  Instead, contrary to the Advocate-General’s suggestion, 
it rejected Spain’s application for annulment as inadmissible, holding that a 
Member State could not attack a selection notice published by Eurojust.171  
Only the candidates themselves had such a right.172  This may be thought 
surprising, since Member States, like institutions, are “privileged” applicants 
and interveners; they do not have to demonstrate an interest in their action or 
intervention173 as they are presumed to have an interest in the legality of any 
act of the institutions.  The Court was perhaps unenthusiastic about dealing 
with these sensitive questions, if it did not have to.  However, it was likely 
even at the time that they would come before the Court in any case, as a 
result of an appeal against a judgment of the CFI in some future case, and 
that is indeed what has happened, in one of the subsequent Member State 
cases which form the third act of the story.  The Court’s reasons were 
specific to the position of Eurojust, whose “competences” were, at least at 
that time, outside those of the Community.  Those reasons did not apply to 
acts of Community institutions over which the Court had jurisdiction under 
what was then Article 230 of the EC (now Article 263 of the TFEU).  This 
                                                                                                                   
 167 Id. para. 70. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. para. 71.  There was a different method of publication for the notices attacked in 
Cases T-185/05, Italy v. Comm'n [2008] ECR II-3207 and in Joined Cases, T-156 and 232/07, 
Spain v. Comm'n (judgment of 13 September 2010, not yet reported) and Joined Cases T-166 
and 285/07, Italy v. Comm'n (also judgment of 13 September 2010, not yet reported). 
 170 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139, paras. 77, 72. 
 171 Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2077. 
 172 Id. paras. 42–43. 
 173 See TFEU art. 263 (compare para. 2, with para. 4); Statute of the European Court of 
Justice, supra note 65, art. 40, paras. 1–2. 
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has since been expressly confirmed by the CFI in Case T-185/05, Italy v. 
Commission (Case T-185/05).174  
C.  Judgments of the Court of First Instance/General Court and the Civil 
Service Tribunal Since 2006 
The jurisdiction previously exercised by the ECJ over direct actions by 
Member States against acts of the institutions—of which Eurojust is an 
example—is now exercised by the General Court (GC) (formerly the CFI).175  
Thus, the most recent actions by Member States against language 
requirements in recruitment procedures have been brought in the CFI/ GC.  
This means that, as in Kik, the question can be taken to the ECJ on appeal.  
At the same time, the CFI’s former jurisdiction over staff cases (including 
those brought by candidates for recruitment) has been transferred to the 
European Union Civil Service Tribunal (CST).176 
We have already seen, in Part A of this Chapter, that by 2004 the CFI 
already had established a number of principles which diverge from the 
Opinion of the Advocate-General in Eurojust.  Thus: 
(a) officials are entirely subject to the SR/CEOS and therefore 
the institutions do not have to apply Article 2 or 3 of 
Regulation 1/58 in dealings with them.  Institutions can 
use whatever Union language suits them, so long as the 
official has sufficient knowledge of it to understand these 
communications;177  
(b) candidates in recruitment procedures are also subject to 
the internal language regime;178 
(c) in the case of one of the historic institutions, a requirement 
to know a particular language, or indeed two particular 
                                                                                                                   
 174 Case T-185/05, Italy v Comm’n [2008] ECR II-3207.  
 175 TFEU art. 256(1) (e.g., EC Treaty art. 225(1)); Statute of the European Court of Justice, 
supra note 65, art. 51 (stating that acts of the Commission are not excepted from this change, 
unlike certain acts of the Council and the Parliament, for which jurisdiction remains with the 
Court). 
 176 Council Decision 2004/752, establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, 
2004 O.J. (L 333) 7 (EC). 
 177 See supra text accompanying note 120 (discussing Rudolph). 
 178 See supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing Bonaiti Brighina). 
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languages, can be justified “for functional reasons” with 
no need for specific justification.179 
Principles (a) and (b) demonstrate that it is not necessary, in relation to 
recruitment procedures, to give any specific justification, e.g., for derogating 
from Regulation 1/58 or from the Treaty principle of linguistic diversity.  
This is contrary to what the Advocate-General suggested in Eurojust.  
Instead, the relevant criterion is simply “the interest of the service.”  Only if 
an applicant shows that a language condition is not justified by reference to 
the needs of the service can there be any question of annulment.  Even a 
requirement to know two particular languages can be justified by principle 
(c), again contrary to the Advocate-General’s view.180  These principles have 
been further confirmed and developed in the most recent CFI/GC judgments, 
in particular, the following three cases.  
1.  Italy v. Commission181 
This case concerned a vacancy notice for the recruitment of the Director-
General of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which was published in 
full the Official Journal, but only in English, French, and German.182  A 
short notice referring candidates to this full publication also appeared in 
some international publications and in the main daily newspapers in all the 
Member States, including two of the main Italian papers.183  These short-
form publications were in the language of the newspaper or periodical.184  
This method of publication was pursuant to an internal Commission Decision 
of 2004 on recruitment procedures for senior staff.185  Because of a lack of 
translation capacity, for a two-year period vacancy notices would be 
published only in three languages.186  
                                                                                                                   
 179 See supra text accompanying note 127 (discussing Hendrickx). 
 180 But see infra note 200.  The GC seems to have retreated from this position in the most 
recent cases.  It remains to be seen, in the light of future judgments, whether this is temporary. 
 181 Case T-185/05, Italy v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-3207, paras. 29–32. 
 182 Id. para. 5. 
 183 Id. paras. 8–9. 
 184 Id. para. 9. 
 185 Id. para. 5. 
 186 Id. 
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The notice thus published only referred to the minimum language 
requirements under Article 28 of the SR.187  However, it also required 
candidates to submit a curriculum vitae/resume and a “letter of motivation” 
in English, French, or German.188  Italy sought the annulment of the notice 
and of the internal decision on publication of senior posts.189  The application 
succeeded, but only in relation to the method of publication.190 
The CFI held the action admissible, both in respect of the notice and the 
internal decision, unlike what happened in Eurojust,191 where the ECJ held 
Article 230 of the EC (now Article 263 of the TFEU) inapplicable to acts of 
bodies which do not exercise Community “competence.”192  In this case, the 
contested act was of the Commission.  
As to substance, two issues arose: the method of publication and the 
language conditions in the application procedure.193  Concerning publication, 
the CFI first repeats the Kik principle, that there is no general right for every 
citizen to receive everything from the institutions in his or her Union 
language.194  Then, not following the Eurojust opinion, it repeats instead its 
own rule, that Regulation 1/58 does not apply to existing staff or to 
candidates for recruitment.195  Nor do the SR require vacancies to be 
published in all official languages.196  It followed that the Commission was 
entitled to adopt an internal decision restricting the languages of 
publication.197  As to the substantive language requirements in the notice, the 
CFI points out that the conditions in the SR/CEOS are only a minimum, and 
the institution may always lay down stricter conditions, including knowledge 
of certain languages, “where the requirements of the service or those of the 
post so require.”198  The reference to “requirements of the service” as an 
alternative to the requirements of the post clearly means that there is no need 
to justify the condition post by post, and that a general situation within the 
                                                                                                                   
 187 Id. para. 8.  For the relevant Staff Regulation, see STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99, 
art. 28, at I-14 (requiring a thorough knowledge of one Union language and satisfactory 
knowledge of another). 
 188 Case T-185/05, Italy v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-3207, para. 8. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. paras. 83–153. 
 191 Id. paras. 19–82.   
 192 Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2077, paras. 35–44. 
 193 T-185/05, Italy v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-3207, para. 116. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. paras. 117–119 (referring to Bonaiti Brighina and Rasmussen). 
 196 Id. para. 121. 
 197 Id. para. 122. 
 198 Id. para. 134. 
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service is enough (such as the two-language regime in the Council in 
Hendrickx).  This is confirmation of the difference between the GC (the old 
CFI) and the ideas of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro.  The CFI could 
have limited itself to the requirements of the post since this case, like 
Eurojust, concerned a vacancy notice for a specific post.  The fact that the 
CFI nevertheless referred also to the “requirements of the service” is 
therefore significant.  Even if it is technically an obiter dictum in Italy v. 
Commission, we shall see that it has become a rule in later cases.  Later cases 
concern competitions creating reserve lists to fill possible future vacancies, 
so that it is not known at the time of publication which posts the successful 
candidates may be offered.  The requirements of the service are what matters 
in respect of competitions of this kind. 
There is a connection between the publication regime and the language 
conditions.  If the latter are justified by the needs of the service or of the 
post, then publication only in the languages concerned is also justified: “The 
fact that the text of the vacancy notice concerned is only available in 
[certain] languages does not result in discrimination between candidates, 
since they must all have an understanding of at least one of those 
languages.”199  However, there is a difference between only publishing in 
certain languages and only publishing in certain language versions of the 
Official Journal.  The latter practice is likely to lead to discrimination 
between readers of that Journal, since even readers who meet the language 
conditions will not be informed of the existence of the competition, unless 
other measures are taken to ensure that all potential candidates are 
informed.200  The Commission’s decision to post the notices had not 
provided for such alternative measures and was thus unlawful, as was the 
notice itself, as likely to lead to discrimination between candidates on 
grounds of language.201  The fact that the three languages concerned were 
“fairly widely spoken in Europe” was not enough to justify the potential 
discrimination.202 
                                                                                                                   
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. paras. 135–138.  However, the Court introduces ambiguity in 152 by suggesting that 
alternative measures should have been taken to inform those who did not have sufficient 
knowledge of English, French, or German to discover the content of the notice.  This is 
contrary to the Court’s acceptance of the trilingual publishing framework as justifiable in para. 
134, so long as the post possesses and the notice communicates a substantive requirement to 
know one or more of the three languages. 
 201 Id. paras. 141–142, 151. 
 202 Id. para. 147.  The CFI only refers to three languages as “fairly widely spoken in 
Europe,” whereas the ECJ was more forthright.  Id. 
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2.  Joined Cases Spain v. Commission and Italy v. Commission203 
These cases concerned not a vacancy notice for a particular job, but 
notices for three open competitions to establish reserve lists for possible 
future recruitment.  The notices were published in the Official Journal 
pursuant to Annex III SR by the European Personnel Selection Office, the 
inter-institutional recruitment office (to which the Commission answers in 
court).204  They were published in full in English, French, and German 
only.205  A summary notice appeared in other language versions of the 
Official Journal, referring candidates to the full version.206  The notices also 
indicated that candidates had to choose a second language for certain tests, 
and that the language had to be English, French, or German.207  To ensure 
equal treatment, all candidates had to do these tests in their second language, 
including those whose first language was one of the three.208  The Spanish 
cases concern only the publication regime, whereas the Italian government 
also attacked the substantive language requirements.209  In particular, Italy 
and Spain alleged infringement of Articles 12, 253, and 290 of the EC (now 
18, 296, and 340 TFEU), of Regulation 1/58, and of the principles of non-
discrimination and multilinguism.210 All of these arguments were rejected by 
the CFI.211  However, Italy has now appealed to the ECJ.212  The CFI’s 
judgments are in many respects similar to that in Case T-185/05, Italy v. 
                                                                                                                   
 203 Joined Cases T-156/07 & T-232/07, Spain v. Comm’n, judgment of 13 September 2010, 
not yet reported [hereinafter Spain v. Comm’n]; Joined Cases T-166/07 & T-285/07, Italy v. 
Comm’n, judgment of 13 September 2010, not yet reported [hereinafter Italy v. Comm’n]. 
 204 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 6; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 6.  
 205 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 6–9; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 
6–9. 
 206 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 9; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 9. 
 207 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 9; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 9.  
This choice reflected two considerations: on the one hand, the Commission has a long-
standing internal practice that documents for decision must be submitted to the Commission 
itself in these three languages.  On the other hand, EPSO’s own observations of the last 
competitions carried out under the previous language regime (in which candidates could have 
any official languages as their “first” language and a satisfactory knowledge of any other) 
were that, despite the free choice of second language, over 90% of candidates from the fifteen 
pre-2004 Member States had chosen either English, French, or German. 
 208 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 9; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 9. 
 209 See generally Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203.  
 210 See Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203. 
 211 See Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203. 
 212 Case C-566/10 P, Italy v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 63) 21. 
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Commission, to which the CFI makes frequent reference.213  It dismisses the 
argument based on Article 290 EC (Article 342 TFEU) and Regulation 1/58, 
citing Kik, Bonaiti Brighina, and Case T-185/05, Italy v. Commission.214  The 
cases confirm: (i) that there is no rule or principle of Community law 
requiring competition notices to be published in the Official Journal in all 
languages;215 (ii) that there is no principle that all citizens must always 
receive all communications from the institutions in their official language;216 
(iii) that relations between the institutions and their staff (and candidates217) 
fall exclusively under the SR;218 (iv) that in any case, Article 290 EC (Article 
342 TFEU) is not an autonomous rule, but is merely the legal basis for 
Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 which expressly permits internal language 
regimes.219  The GC then removes the ambiguity left by Case T-185/05, Italy 
v. Commission, by making it quite clear that it is acceptable in a competition 
like this one to publish a notice in full only in some languages, with a short-
form notice in others.220  This does not lead to any discrimination concerning 
the opportunity to take part, since everyone has the same possibility of being 
informed about the existence of the competition.221  In any case, the method 
of publication was justified by the link with the content of the competition: 
there would be no point in requiring publication in full in all the languages, 
since candidates who did not have sufficient knowledge of English, French, 
or German to understand the notice would not meet the conditions for 
admission.222  The CFI repeats the formula used in Case T-185/05, Italy v. 
Commission, that the institutions are free to impose stricter language 
                                                                                                                   
 213 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 50; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 52. 
 214 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 89; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 136. 
 215 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 86–89; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 
91–92. 
 216 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 86–89; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 
91–92. 
 217 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 56; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 54.  
The justification being that they are not communicating with the Institution like other citizens, 
but exclusively in order to obtain a post as an official, which presupposes certain language 
skills which may thus be required in the notice. 
 218 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 56; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 54. 
 219 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 52–56; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 
41, 52–57, 72–73. 
 220 See supra note 174. 
 221 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 61–62; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 
77–78.  However, the GC seems to have abandoned this particular element of its reasoning in 
Case T-117/08, discussed infra Part VI.C.5. 
 222 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 65, 74; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 
81. 
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requirements than the minima referred to in Article 28(f) whenever the needs 
of the post so require or simply those “of the service,” thus exempting the 
institution from any obligation to justify the requirements post by post.223  
This would be difficult for a reserve list competition because, unlike a 
vacancy notice, it is not directed at particular posts but to those that might 
become vacant over a given period.  The GC also repeats and develops the 
Bonaiti Brighina ruling.224  It seems to be simply part of the inherent power 
to organize the work of the institution: 
It is true, as the Kingdom of Spain argues, that there is no 
written rule of Community law indicating that German, English 
and French are the internal languages of the Commission and 
of other Community Institutions or bodies.  However, a 
Community Institution or body can choose one or more 
languages for internal purposes, provided that that choice is 
based on objective considerations, related to the specific 
functional requirements of the Institution or body concerned, 
taking account, in particular, of the diversity of the staff it 
recruits.  The use of several languages inside the services of the 
institution or body concerned can indeed require knowledge of 
one of these working languages.  In such a case, however, it 
would appear to be sufficient to require knowledge of only one 
of these languages.  A requirement to have a cumulative 
knowledge of various languages cannot be justified by the need 
for internal communication . . . .225  
                                                                                                                   
 223 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 65; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 81. 
 224 See Case T-118/99, Bonaiti Brighina v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-97 (noting that the 
institutions are free to determine their own internal language regime even without adopting a 
formal act for this purpose). 
 225 See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139.  Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, 
para. 75; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 56, 93–94, 102.  This seems to be a retreat 
from its position in Hendrickx v. Council, where it accepted a requirement to know two 
internal languages.  See Case T-376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, para. 44.  
This might simply reflect the fact that in these competitions, the requirement was to take 
exams in one of the second languages (English, French, or German) but not to know two of 
the languages.  In Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 94.  The Court gives greater 
emphasis than in Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, to the need to avoid any factual 
discrimination among Union citizens in access to Union jobs.  On the other hand, the Court 
adds a reference to criteria which might help determine what the objective needs of the 
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This seems to be confirmed by the rejection of the argument that the 
choice of the three languages required to be reasoned in the competition 
notice.  No such reasoning is required, the CFI says, where it is clear that the 
choice reflects the institution’s internal needs.226  In the judgment in Case T-
166/07, the GC also confirms what it already said in Case T-185/05 Italy v. 
Commission that the applicant must demonstrate that the choice of languages 
was not proportionate or appropriate.  Here, Italy had not done so.227  The 
CFI also emphasized the lack of discriminatory effect, since (a) the 
requirement was only to know one of the three second languages and (b) the 
fact that the “first” language could be any official Union language 
guaranteed appropriate diversity of access.228 
3.  Marcuccio v. Commission229 
This case is essentially a repetition, first by the CST, then by the GC, of 
the principles confirmed in Rudolph, Rasmussen, and Case T-185/05, Italy v. 
Commission: unlike other Union citizens, an official (or former official, in 
this case) cannot write to an institution, in a matter connected with his or her 
employment, in his or her own language and insist on a reply in that 
language.  Relations between institutions and officials or agents are not 
covered by the language rules in the TEU and the TFEU, the CFR, or by 
Regulation 1/58.230  Indeed, to require the institutions to apply these rules in 
relations with officials would impose an intolerable burden on them.231  If an 
institution sends an official a document in one of its working languages, it is 
only required to provide a translation if the official does not have sufficient 
knowledge of the language to take note of the document’s contents.232  
Interestingly, the CST, influenced by the applicant’s record of ill-considered 
litigation, held that these matters were so obvious that the case was 
                                                                                                                   
institution might be, such as its history, where it has its seat, the nature of its duties, and the 
needs of internal communication.  Id. 
 226 Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 88; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 126. 
 227 Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 99. 
 228 Id. paras. 97, 101. 
 229 Cases F-3/08 and T-515/09 P, Marcuccio v. Comm’n, Orders of the CST of 7 October 
2009 and of the General Court of 18 October 2010, not yet reported. 
 230 Id. paras. 45–54. 
 231 Id. para. 31, quoting Joined Cases F-51/05 and F-18/06, Duyster v. Comm’n, paras. 58–
59, not yet reported. 
 232 Id. paras. 45–47. 
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vexatious.233  Thus, the applicant should be ordered to pay certain court costs 
as well as the Commission’s costs.234  
4.  Italy v. Commission235 
This case concerned not a competition for recruitment of officials (for 
which there is an obligation under Annex III of the Staff Regulations to 
publish the competition notice in the Official Journal), but a “call for 
expressions of interest” (CEI) for a selection procedure for contract agents, a 
new category of temporary staff employed under contracts.  Articles 79 and 
following of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS) do 
not lay down any requirements as to publication.  Italy attacked two aspects 
of the CEI: (i) the fact that it was only published in three languages (English, 
French, and German) and (ii) the fact that while candidates could have any 
Union language as their “main” language, they had to undergo part of the 
tests in a second language, which had to be different from their main 
language236 and had to be chosen from among the three languages just 
mentioned.  
In this case, the information about the selection procedure was published 
on the website of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), which 
only functioned in three languages.  The Commission, which defends EPSO's 
decisions in court, argued that the situation was not the same as that which 
had led to the annulment of the vacancy notice in Case T-185/05.  In that 
case, the notice had been published in the Official Journal, but only in three 
language versions, so that a reader whose own language was not one of these 
three, but who did meet the language conditions for the job might 
nevertheless miss the notice if he or she read the Official Journal in his or her 
own language.  In the present case, the Commission argued, there was no 
discrimination in access to the information, since it was only available on the 
website.  Everyone thus had the same chance of discovering it, whatever 
their own language.  
                                                                                                                   
 233 Case F-3/08, paras. 41–44. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Case T-205/07, Italy v. Comm’n, Judgment of the General Court of 3 February 2011, not 
yet reported. 
 236 This requirement ensured that there was no discrimination in favor of those whose main 
language was one of the three.  These candidates had to choose one or the other two languages 
as their second language to ensure that all candidates were in the same position (i.e., all had to 
do the tests in their declared second language, chosen from among the three). 
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The Court did not agree however, and annulled the notice.  It was careful 
to limit the ground of annulment to the question of publication; it expressly 
confirmed its decision in Case T-185/05 that knowledge of particular 
languages can always legitimately be required in the interest of the service.237  
On the other hand, there was a risk of unequal treatment arising from the fact 
that the notice was only available in full in three languages, and that no other 
measures had been adopted to ensure that candidates whose main language 
was not one of the three had an equal chance of discovering the notice.238   
The case thus shows the General Court maintaining the distinction 
between a pragmatic approach to language conditions for recruitment (as in 
Cases T-185/05 and T-166/07) and a strict approach to the manner of 
publishing notices of competitions and selection procedures (as in T-185/05).    
5.  Italy v. ESC239 
This case is similar in certain respects to Case T-185/07: it also concerned 
a vacancy notice for a specific job (in this case an internal notice addressed 
only to candidates who were already officials or other servants of the Union), 
not a competition to draw up a reserve list for jobs which might become 
vacant in the future.  As in Case T-185/07, the GC annuls the vacancy notice 
for reasons exclusively connected with the publication.  
The form of publication was similar to that in Cases T-166 and T-285/07, 
described above in relation to that case.  The notice was thus published in 
full in only three language editions of the Official Journal (English, French, 
and German), with a short-form publication in other language versions 
referring readers to this full publication.  However, there was a small but 
significant difference between the facts of that case and those of this one, and 
the judgment turned on it.  
The difference was that in Cases T-166 and T-285/07, the method of 
publication reflected the language conditions for taking part in the 
competition, in which candidates had to do certain tests in their declared 
“second language,” which had to be one of these three languages.  As 
explained above, the GC concluded that there was no risk of discrimination 
among candidates since: (a) everyone had the same opportunity to discover 
the existence of the competition and (b) in any case, anyone who could not 
                                                                                                                   
 237 T-117/08, Italy v. ESC, Judgment of the General Court of 31 March 2011, not yet 
reported, para. 57. 
 238 Id. paras. 58–63. 
 239 Id. 
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understand the notice in one of these languages was not eligible to apply in 
any case.  
In Case T-117/08, there was no absolute requirement to undergo tests in a 
particular language.  Instead: 
Under the heading “Qualifications and skills”, the contested 
vacancy notice stated, inter alia, the requirement of “[being an 
e]stablished official or temporary member of the staff of a 
European institution, body, office or agency” and of having a 
“[t]horough knowledge of an official language of the European 
Union and [an] excellent knowledge of at least two other 
official languages of the European Union”, specifying that 
“[f]or operational reasons, a good knowledge of English and/or 
French [was] highly desirable.”240 
The GC confirmed its statements in earlier cases that Regulation 1/58 
does not apply to vacancy notices,241 which concern the requirements 
institutions impose on their own staff.  Those are internal matters, to which a 
more flexible linguistic regime applies, the criterion being the interest of the 
service.242  The GC even confirmed that there was no requirement to publish 
vacancy notices systematically in all languages.  Notices could be published 
only in certain languages if appropriate steps were taken to inform all 
potentially interested parties of the existence of the vacancy.243  However, 
confirming earlier statements to the same effect: “although the administration 
is entitled to adopt measures which appear to it to be appropriate in order to 
govern certain aspects of the procedure for recruiting staff, those measures 
must not result in discrimination on grounds of language between the 
candidates for a specific post.”244 
 In this particular case, there was a risk of such discrimination because: 
publication of the text of the contested vacancy notice in the 
Official Journal in only some official languages, when persons 
who have a knowledge only of other official languages are 
entitled to submit an application, is likely, in the absence of 
                                                                                                                   
 240 Id. para. 7. 
 241 Id. para. 41. 
 242 Id. paras. 52–56. 
 243 Id. paras. 70, 74. 
 244 Id. para. 72. 
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other measures to enable that category of potential candidates 
duly to acquaint themselves with the content of that notice, to 
result in discrimination against them. 
 In that situation, the candidates in question would be in a less 
advantageous position in relation to the other candidates, since 
they would not be in a position duly to acquaint themselves 
with the qualifications required by the vacancy notice and the 
conditions and procedural rules for recruitment.  That is a 
prerequisite for submitting an application in the best way, to 
maximise their chances of being accepted for the post 
concerned [see, by analogy, Italy v. Commission, paragraph 
136]. 
 In the present case, it is apparent from the provisions of point 
3 of the contested vacancy notice, as cited in paragraph 7 
above, that knowledge of English and/or French is only “highly 
desirable” and not required.  Potential candidates for the post of 
Secretary-General of the EESC, having a thorough knowledge 
of one official language and an excellent knowledge of at least 
two other official languages, other than one of the three 
languages of publication, were therefore eligible to apply and 
could thus have applied for that post if the vacancy notice had 
been published in a language which they knew and if they had 
thus been informed that the vacancy existed.  
 Moreover, even candidates who have a satisfactory 
knowledge of English, French or German do not necessarily 
look at the editions of the Official Journal in one of those three 
languages, but consult the edition in their own language [Italy 
v. Commission, paragraph 148].  
 There is therefore a significant risk that candidates 
potentially interested in the contested vacancy notice consulted 
only the notices published in all official languages, that is to 
say, the shortened notice of 28 December 2007, merely 
referring to the publication in the Official Journal of the 
contested vacancy notice . . . .245 
This reasoning is narrower than that in Cases T-166 and T-285/07.  In that 
case, the GC accepted the same publication regime for two reasons, 
                                                                                                                   
 245 Id. paras. 78–82. 
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summarised at (a) and (b) above.  Under the reasoning in Case T-117/08, it is 
not accepted that this form of publication allows everyone the same access to 
the information as to the existence of the notice, which was reason (a) in the 
earlier case.  Instead, only reason (b) can now justify this form of 
publication, i.e., there is a link between the method of publication and the 
language requirements of the post. 
A reader might wonder about the practical consequences of the 
annulments in some of the cases brought by Member States.  If the vacancy 
notice or the call for expressions of interest was annulled, what about the 
people who had been appointed on the basis of the procedure which had been 
advertised?  The correct view is that their rights are not affected: they are 
innocent third parties who are not responsible for the illegality of the notice, 
which moreover has only been revealed months or years after the recruitment 
procedure has been completed.  In such a situation it would be excessive to 
consider that the illegality attaching to the notice fed through to the 
individual appointments, which are independent decisions.246 
6.  Angioi v. Commission247  
In this case, an individual candidate attacked the three-language regime 
described above, in connection with her exclusion from a selection procedure 
for contract agents.  She did not put forward the argument about the manner 
of publication of the notice which succeeded in Case T-205/07.248  Instead, 
she argued about the justification of the language conditions of the tests 
themselves.  She put forward a number of arguments, of which only one was 
of general importance.  She argued that (a) a requirement to know a 
particular language can only be justified in relation to a specific post, and 
                                                                                                                   
 246 This is exactly the reasoning followed by the Union courts in relation to other cases 
where individual decisions rejecting candidates were based on a condition in a 
competitionnotice late found to be unlawful.  The Courts consider that the appointments of 
other candidates based on the notice should not be disturbed since they may have occurred 
some considerable time before the finding of illegality and in any case, the persons concerned 
are innocent bystanders, who are not responsible for the illegality of the notice, whereas all 
that is required is to find an appropriate way of giving effect to the annulment for the benefit 
of those who have obtained it.  See e.g. Case C-242/90, Commission v Albani, 1991 E.C.R. I-
3839, paras. 13–17 (determining that the proportionate solution is thus to allow the applicants 
who have obtained the annulment to sit new tests of comparable difficulty to those in the 
original competition).  
 247 Case F-7/07, Angioi v. Comm’n, Judgment of 29 June 2011, not yet reported. 
 248 The notice was not the same as Case T-205/07, though the method of publication was the 
same.  See supra note 235. 
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cannot be imposed generally in a procedure designed only to draw up a 
reserve list and that there was no evidence that a knowledge of English, 
French, or German was essential for all contract agent posts; and (b) that 
Regulation 1/58 applied, and that even if Article 6 allowed the institutions to 
adopt simplified language practices for internal purposes, there was no 
evidence any of them had adopted any decision to that effect, or indeed that 
these three languages were the most commonly used in the institutions.249  
This is a judgment of the full CST, which has not been appealed.  The 
CST essentially follows the reasoning of the GC in Cases T-166 and T-
285/07.  In particular, it accepts that specific language requirements can be 
justified not only in relation to particular posts, but can be imposed more 
generally, given:  
the existence, within the institution, of one or more languages 
of internal communication.  Since an institution has the right, 
even without taking a formal decision to that effect, to choose a 
limited number of languages of internal communication, 
provided that that choice is based on objective considerations 
relating to its operational needs [see, to that effect, Opinion of 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case 
C-160/03 Spain v. Eurojust, points 49 and 56; Spain v. 
Commission, paragraph 75; and Italy v. Commission, paragraph 
93].  It follows that that institution may legitimately impose on 
contract staff whom it intends to recruit a knowledge of 
languages matching those languages of internal 
communication.  Otherwise it would be exposed to the risk of 
employing a staff member who was unable adequately to 
perform his duties within the institution, since that staff 
member would be put in a position, in some circumstances, 
where he was unable, or found it extremely difficult, to 
communicate with his work colleagues and to understand the 
instructions issued by his hierarchical superiors.  In that regard, 
it must be pointed out that, in the judgment 
in Italy v. Commission, given in a case where EPSO had 
published competition notices for the purpose of establishing 
reserve lists intended to fill vacancies for administrators and 
assistants within the European institutions, the General Court 
                                                                                                                   
 249 See summary of arguments Case F-7/07, Angioi v. Comm’n, paras. 78–80. 
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accepted not only that the choice of English, French and 
German corresponded to the operational needs of the 
institutions and bodies of the European Union, but also that 
EPSO had been properly entitled to require the candidates in 
those competitions to have a knowledge, as their second 
language, of one of those three languages [Italy v. Commission, 
paragraph 103].250 
 
The CST, like the GC, recognizes that language requirements must avoid 
creating discrimination between candidates.  It therefore subjects the 
requirements in the instant case to a double test—they must pursue a 
legitimate objective and there must be a “reasonable relationship of 
proportionality” between the requirements and that objective.251  
The requirements in this case passed these tests, since there was evidence 
in the file that “English, French and German are, in varying degrees, used as 
the languages of internal communication within the institutions which are 
likely to recruit a significant proportion of the candidates who pass the 
selection tests, namely the Commission and the Council.”252  Therefore: “the 
language requirements set out in the [notice] pursued a legitimate objective 
in the general interest in the framework of staff policy, namely to ensure that 
those members of staff had a knowledge of languages matching those 
languages of internal communication.”253 
The proportionality test was also met, since the notice only required 
candidates to know one of the three languages as a second language, which is 
all that is required to ensure internal communication inside an institution 
which uses any of two or three languages internally (a requirement to know 
two, or all three, would be disproportionate in such a case and would amount 
to granting a privileged status to certain languages).254  
Nor did the regime chosen involve discrimination.  It was true that 
candidates who had one of the three languages as their main language then 
found their choice of a second language limited to two, whereas other 
candidates, whose main language was not one of the three, had a choice from 
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three.  However, this could not be criticised since it was simply a matter of 
personal circumstances.255 
The CST concludes on this point with certain general remarks: 
Moreover, in the context of the internal functioning of the 
European Union institutions, the choice of language of internal 
communication is the responsibility of those institutions which 
have the power to impose it on their staff.  As provided in 
Article 6 of Regulation No 1 – which was adopted by the 
Council under the Treaty provisions conferring on it 
competence to adopt the rules governing the languages of the 
institutions of the European Union –, the “institutions . . . may 
stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are 
to be used in specific cases.”  Accordingly, contrary to what the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Italian Republic maintain, EPSO 
was properly entitled to limit the choice of second language to 
English, French or German, as it did in the CEI, which had 
been launched “on behalf of the European Institutions and of 
the Commission and the Council in particular.” 
 The argument that EPSO should, in the CEI, have justified 
the choice of the three languages to be used in order to 
participate in the pre-selection tests must also be rejected, since 
it is common ground that that choice reflected the internal 
requirements of the institutions.256 
 A concluding point concerns the possible relevance of statistics in order 
to verify the supposed discriminatory effects of a system in which candidates 
are required to have knowledge of certain official languages.  In Eurojust, 
the Advocate-General looked at the statistical evidence and it helped him 
conclude that there was no reason to criticize what had been done, save as to 
one post.257  However, the Courts have not yet found it necessary to 
pronounce on the point, although such evidence was available in Case T-
156/07, Spain v. Commission, concerning the number of applications broken 
down by nationality.258  This evidence appeared to confirm that there had 
been no effect of favoring native speakers of English, French, or German.  
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D.  Pending Cases  
It remains to mention the cases still pending.  In the GC there are:  
  (1) Case T-142/08, Italy v. Commission, concerns Open 
Competitions EPSO/AD/116 and 117/08;259 
  (2) Case T-164/08, Italy v. Commission, is about Open 
Competition EPSO/AD/125/08;260  
  (3) Case T-126/09, Italy v. Commission, concerns Open 
Competitions EPSO/AD/144/09, EPSO/AD/145/09 and 
EPSO/AD/146/09, which are special post-enlargement 
competitions for junior administrators exclusively from the 
Member States which joined in 2004 and 2007;261   
  (4) Case T-218/09, Italy v. Commission, relates to Open 
Competitions EPSO/AST/91/09 and EPSO/AST/92/09 for the 
recruitment of specialist assistant staff;262 
  (5) Case T-248/10, Italy v. Commission, is about Open 
Competition EPSO/AD/177/10, for junior administrators.263  
The most important pending case however is Case C-566/10 P, Italy v. 
Commission,264 which is Italy's appeal to the ECJ against the judgment of the 
GC in Joined Cases T-166 and T-285/07 (above).  The abovementioned GC 
cases have been suspended pending judgment on this appeal.  
VII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 The case law of the GC and the CST reflects the clear distinction made 
in Regulation 1/58 between the external and internal language regimes.  The 
former concerns communication between the institutions and Member States 
or between the institutions and citizens, formal acts in particular.  This 
regime is strict: the institutions must use specific official languages 
appropriate to that state or that citizen. 
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The institutions, however, recognized from the outset that a different and 
more flexible regime was needed for informal internal communication inside 
the institutions.  Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 thus allows for an internal 
language regime to be laid down in each institution’s rules of procedure.265  
The institutions have hesitated to make full use of this possibility, no doubt 
because formally recognizing that certain official languages are more widely 
used than others is seen as problematic.  Some institutions, for example, have 
adopted rules, but this adoption is only a formality, since the rules are more 
or less copies of the external rules of Regulation 1/58 (e.g., Council and 
Parliament).  On the other hand, regardless of which approach is taken in the 
rules of procedure, each institution has certain purely factual language 
practices.266  These practices tend to be more visible when the institutions 
publish a vacancy notice or a competition notice to recruit staff.  The 
doubling of the number of official languages since 2004 has made it 
necessary to impose knowledge of particular language requirements to 
ensure that internal communication is maintained.  At the same time, 
candidates can have any official language as their first language, which 
ensures geographical balance and the possibility of communicating 
externally to native-speaker standard in all languages.  Publications in the 
Official Journal which require candidates to have particular languages and to 
pass certain tests in a second language, are chosen from the three languages 
considered to be the most widely-spoken.  As a result, what could be 
tolerated so long as it was simply an internal practice, became intolerable for 
some.  Once the internal practices became visible in official publications, 
certain Member States brought actions against the institutions. 
The ECJ has yet to pronounce on these matters—hence the considerable 
importance of the future judgment in Case C-566/10 P, Italy v. Commission.  
The Court has upheld the need to observe the strict linguistic regime of 
Regulation 1/58 in Skoma-Lux.267  Legislation is only enforceable against 
citizens in a given Member State when it is published in the language which 
the Union recognizes as official with respect to that state.268  The Court has 
also dealt with an intermediate situation in Kik, namely where the 
relationship between the institution and the citizen is of what may be called a 
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commercial nature, such as granting an intellectual property right against 
payment.269  Here, it recognizes that the Union legislature may validly adopt 
a limited language regime, to take account of the various interests potentially 
involved.270  Only now, however, is the Court confronted with the question 
already considered several times by the CFI/GC and the CST, of whether 
internal language practices of an institution can justify the published 
requirement to know particular official languages.271  The requirement 
appears not in a binding legislative text but in a purely informative text, 
namely a competition notice, which is simply an invitation to apply if one so 
wishes.272  Eurojust seemed to provide the opportunity for dealing with the 
point, and the Advocate-General was prepared to recognize that such 
requirements can be justified, but the institution must be prepared (he says) 
to provide a concrete justification—a requirement, by the way, which the 
CFI/GC case law has not expressly imposed.273  The Court did not answer 
the question in Eurojust, given the particular features of that organization 
which, the Court held, meant that vacancy notices could not be attacked by a 
Member State.274  These features are not present in Case C-566/10 P, Italy v. 
Commission.275  The judgment is thus awaited with considerable interest. 
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